During the years before the surge of democratization in 1987-1993, reported happiness levels showed strong nation-level correlations with measures of democracy such as the Freedom House political rights and civil liberties scores: the correlations were in the .7 to .8 range. This could be interpreted as meaning that: (1) living under democratic institutions makes people happy; or (2) high levels of subjective well-being are conducive to democratic institutions; or (3) the correlation could be spurious, reflecting the fact that both subjective well-being and democracy are strongly correlated with some other variable such as high levels of economic development. Which is it? The answer is important: If democracy makes people happy, this is a powerful argument for democracy, even apart from other considerations such as the Democratic Peace thesis; on the other hand, if high levels of happiness are conducive to democracy, this has important implications concerning how democracy emerges and flourishes.
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Throughout the two decades before the explosion of democracy that occurred around 1990, reported happiness levels showed strong linkages with all of the widelyaccepted measures of democracy. The national-level correlations between happiness and the Freedom House political rights and civil liberties scores were in the .7 to .8 range-a remarkably strong linkage that could be interpreted to mean that over half of the total variation in a society's level of happiness could be attributed to its level of democracy; or conversely, it could mean that a society's level of democracy largely reflected its happiness level.
Correlation is not causation, and this linkage could reflect any of the following things: (1) living under democratic institutions makes people much happier than living under authoritarian institutions; or (2) high levels of subjective well-being are conducive to democratic institutions; or (3) the correlation could be spurious, due to the fact that both subjective well-being and democracy are strongly correlated with some other variable such as high levels of economic development. Though the political culture literature has long argued that interpersonal trust and tolerance play an important role in the emergence and flourishing of democratic institutions, it has largely neglected the role of human happiness. But it is logical to expect that high levels of happiness would be linked with democracy. Political economy research demonstrates that if the economic cycle has been going well, support for the incumbents increases. Support for a democratic regime reflects a much deeper long-term processes. If, in the long run, people feel that their life as a whole has been good under a given regime, it produces legitimacy and diffuse support for that regime. High levels of subjective well-being can also help stabilize authoritarian regimes, of course. Thus, China has experienced high levels of economic growth throughout the past two decades, and her public shows much higher levels of subjective well-being than the ex-communist regimes of Eastern Europe. This almost certainly helps legitimate China's one-party communist regime-in the short run. But in the long run, economic growth tends to bring cultural changes through which the public gradually places increasing importance on autonomy and self-expression-which eventually gives rise to demands for a more liberal political order (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005) . Legitimacy is helpful to any regime, but authoritarian systems can survive through coercion; democratic regimes must have mass support or they can be voted out of existence like the Weimar republic. Thus, societies with happy publics are far more likely to survive as democracies, than those with unhappy publics. Moreover, high levels of subjective well-being are linked with trust, tolerance and emphasis on self-expression that is conducive to the emergence and survival of democracy.
( Figure 1 about here) Accordingly, a remarkably strong relationship existed between democracy and the self-reported happiness levels of given publics, throughout the period before the explosion of democracy that occurred around 1990. Figure 1 shows this relationship among the 39 countries for which we have long-term survey data.
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As this figure demonstrates, happiness and democracy were strongly linked in the 1980s: the correlation between the two is r = .81, and although we do not have survey data from the 1970s, the happiness levels of given societies tend to be relatively stable, and the levels shown here show almost equally strong relationships with the same countries' Freedom House scores 1 In order to carry out time series analysis, these analyses are based only on those countries for which we have data covering at least 15 years. We use the earliest available measure of happiness levels for the countries shown in Figure 1 ; for 22 countries, the data are from the 1981 World Values Survey, and for 17 countries the data are from the 1990 World Values Survey. throughout the period from 1972 to 1987. This confirms previous findings that happiness is closely correlated with democracy (Inglehart, 1990; Stutzer. 2000, 2002) .
Both democracy and human happiness vary a great deal from one society to another. The societies examined here range from long-established liberal democracies such as Britain, Sweden, Denmark, the United States and Canada, to countries that were extremely authoritarian in 1981-1986, such as China, Russia, and Bulgaria.
2 Happiness levels also vary greatly. The happiness levels used here could theoretically range from 0.00 (if everyone in the society said they were "extremely unhappy") to 3.00 (if everyone said they were "very happy). To provide some concrete illustrations: in Ireland (with a mean score of 2.36) fully 41 percent of the public described themselves as "very happy;" while in Belarus (with a mean score of 1.46), only 5 percent described themselves as "very happy."
One way to explain the strong linkage shown here between happiness and democracy, would be to assume that democracy makes people happy. This interpretation is appealing and suggests that we have a quick fix for most of the world's problems:
adopt a democratic constitution and live happily ever after.
Unfortunately, the experience of most of the Soviet successor states does not support this interpretation. Since their dramatic move toward democracy in 1991, their people have not become happier: for the most part, they moved in exactly the opposite direction with the sharp decline of their economy and society, as we will see.
Nevertheless, we believe that in the long run, a climate of free choice is conducive to happiness. Given individuals may not be conscious of the linkage between free choice and happiness, but those who feel they have relatively high levels of control and choice over how their lives turn out, consistently report higher levels of life satisfaction than those who don't. Free choice tends to make people happier. This is a driving force in the process of human development: rising emphasis on free choice favors democracy--the 2 The vertical axis is based on the sum of each country's Freedom House scores for 1981 to 1986, which run from 2 to 14, with high scores reflecting low levels of democracy. In order to reverse this polarity, each country's score was subtracted from 14, producing scores ranging from 0 to 12 for any given year, and a maximum score of 72 for the six-year period. The original happiness scores ranged from 1 to 4, with high scores indicating low levels of happiness; their polarity was also reversed, by subtracting each country's mean score from 4, to produce scores ranging from 0 to a theoretical maximum of 3, which would be obtained if everyone described themselves as "very happy." Accordingly, on Figure 1 , high scores indicate high levels of happiness and democracy.
institutions that maximize human freedom. But democratic institutions are by no means the only factor shaping human happiness. Protracted periods of economic growth seem to be conducive to rising levels of happiness, and severe economic decline can have the opposite effect. Similarly, the breakdown of the social and political order that accompanied the collapse of communism in many societies was linked with declining levels of happiness, despite the sharp, sudden increase in political rights and civil liberties that occurred at the same time. We suspect that democratic institutions do contribute to human happiness to an appreciable extent, but the causal linkage seems to work much more strongly in the opposite direction, with democratic institutions being much more likely to flourish in a social climate characterized by high levels of subjective wellbeing-which are linked with high levels of trust, tolerance and emphasis on selfexpression, constituting a syndrome of "Self-expression values" (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005) . given societies (Inglehart, 1990:25-28 ) -and they are strongly correlated with both per capita GNP and with democracy (Inglehart, 1990: 31-44) . They can and do change over time--economic, social and political developments seem to have an impact-but they tend to change rather slowly. A public's assessment that their lives as a whole are going well or badly, seems to be a deep-rooted orientation. Slovenia shows a more positive picture. A dramatic increase in her level of democracy (rising eight points on the 12-point maximum) has been accompanied by a modest but steady rise in happiness levels. But it seems unlikely that this increase is due to democratization alone, for Slovenia had impressive economic growth during this period, and is now the only ex-communist country that has risen into the World Bank's "high income" category; moreover, Slovenia's political situation has become substantially more stable than that of many other ex-communist countries, with her entry into both the European Union and NATO.
( We have long-term evidence from two other societies that experienced a transition to democracy since 1981: South Africa and Argentina. In both cases, happiness levels experienced a modest rise after the transition, although the change on the happiness scale was much smaller than the change on the democracy scale, as Figures 8 and 9 demonstrate: while democracy scores rose by eight points in both countries, the happiness levels rose by less than one point on a scale having the same range as the democracy scale.
Data are also available from a number of societies that did not experience recent transitions to democracy but they reveal little about the relationship between happiness
and democracy because neither variable shows much movement. With Sweden and the U.S., for example, the pattern shows two almost parallel lines, with democracy remaining constant at point 12 (the top of the scale) and happiness fluctuating at a level slightly above point 9.
( Table 1 about here)
The evidence we have reviewed up to this point suggests that democracy may be conducive to human happiness, but its immediate impact seems to be rather modest--and transitions to democracy can even be linked with declining levels of happiness.
Additional factors seem to be involved. In order to test the relative impact of democracy and other likely factors, we carried out multiple regression analysis. Table 1 Finally, we also use the society's level of Postmaterialist values, as an indicator of the extent to which the society emphasizes self-expression and free choice, in keeping with the Human Development thesis which holds that free choice is conducive to human happiness (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005) . We have already noted that happiness and free choice are closely linked in the syndrome of Self-expression values-but for present purposes, we want to examine the impact that emphasis on free choice has on happiness, controlling for other factors.
In Model 1 of this analysis, these five independent variables explain more than 55 percent of the cross-national variance in happiness. Although per capita GNP has a fairly strong and significant zero-order correlation with happiness (r = .52), its impact disappears when we include the other variables in this analysis. But a country's economic growth rate during the decade preceding the time when happiness was measured, does show an impact on its happiness level that is significant at the .001 level.
In keeping with the aspiration-adjustment model (Campbell, Converse and Rodgers, 1976; Inglehart, 1990) , improving or deteriorating economic conditions seem to have more impact on a society's happiness level than does its absolute level of wealth. When we drop per capita GNP from the regression equation (Model 2 percent to 40 percent. Living in an environment of economic and psychological security seems to have a powerful impact on a society's happiness level. The fact that both of these attributes tend to go with high levels of economic development largely explains the strong zero-order correlation between GNP per capita and happiness.
( Table 2 about here)
It is relatively difficult to explain recent shifts in a society's happiness level, but let us attempt to do so. Table 2 showed dramatic shifts toward greater tolerance in many societies during this period, and they provide stronger predictors of changing happiness levels than do Materialist/Postmaterialist values, though all three of these variables are closely linked.
Thus we are again using indicators of economic and psychological security, together with an indicator of a society's relative level of democracy, as predictors of happiness-but this time, we are trying to explain recent changes in happiness levels.
These analyses explain a much smaller percentage of the variance than our earlier analyses: the four independent variables included in Model 1 explain only 14 percent of the change in happiness levels from 1981 to 2000. And although recent economic growth had a substantial impact on the happiness levels analyzed in Table 1 , it does not show a significant impact on the changes in happiness levels analyzed here. When we drop economic growth from the equation (Model 2) the percentage of variance that is explained, remains unchanged. Each of the three remaining independent variables does seem to have a fairly sizeable impact on the change in happiness levels experienced from 1981 to 2000, and when we drop one of them from the regression, the explained variance drops appreciably. Interestingly, a society's level of democracy in 1991-1996 seems to have more impact on changes in happiness than it did on levels of happiness; when dropped from the analysis in Table 2 , the explained variance falls by three percentage points (compare Models 3 and 5), although it accounted for only slightly more than one percent of the variance explained in Table 1 Note: Democracy is measured by the two Freedom House scales, which range from1 to 7; their sum ranges from 2 to 14 but since high scores indicate low democracy, their polarity is reversed by subtracting them from 14, producing a scale that ranges from 0 to 12. Happiness is measured on a scale that ranges from 1 to 4, but since high scores indicate low happiness, polarity is reversed by subtracting from 4, producing a scale that ranges from 0 to 3. This score is then multiplied by 4 to produce a scale that ranges from 0 to 12--giving both happiness and democracy the same 0-12 range. The 1981 happiness score is from a survey in Tambov oblast, which parallels the Russian republic rather closely. 
